defi-amm-security
affaan-m/ecc
Security checklist and hardened patterns for Solidity AMM contracts, liquidity pools, and swap functions.
What is defi-amm-security?
A reference guide for auditing and implementing secure Solidity AMM contracts. Covers critical vulnerability patterns including reentrancy, CEI ordering, donation attacks, oracle manipulation, slippage protection, and safe integer math. Use this when writing or reviewing liquidity pool contracts, swap flows, and admin functions.
- Provides hardened code examples for reentrancy protection and CEI ordering
- Demonstrates safe share math that resists donation and inflation attacks
- Shows TWAP-based oracle patterns to prevent flash-loan manipulation
- Includes slippage and deadline validation for swap entrypoints
- Covers safe reserve math using libraries like FullMath to prevent overflow
- Supplies admin control patterns with access-gating and two-step ownership
How to install defi-amm-security
npx skills add null --skill defi-amm-securityHow to use defi-amm-security
- 1.Review each user-facing entrypoint (deposit, withdraw, swap, mint, burn) against the security checklist
- 2.Apply the hardened code patterns from the examples to your contract functions
- 3.Use OpenZeppelin utilities like ReentrancyGuard, SafeERC20, and Ownable2Step
- 4.Implement TWAP-based oracle reads instead of spot prices for price feeds
- 5.Add amountOutMin and deadline parameters to all swap functions
- 6.Run static analysis with Slither and fuzzing with Echidna or Foundry before production
Use cases
- Auditing a Solidity AMM or liquidity pool contract before deployment
- Implementing deposit, withdraw, mint, or burn flows that hold token balances
- Reviewing contracts that use token.balanceOf(address(this)) in share calculations
- Adding fee setters, pausers, or oracle update functions to a DeFi protocol
- Hardening swap functions with proper slippage and deadline checks
- Solidity smart contract developers building AMM or liquidity pool protocols
- Security auditors reviewing DeFi contracts
- Protocol engineers adding admin or governance functions to existing pools
defi-amm-security FAQ
Attackers can send tokens directly to the contract outside the intended deposit path, inflating the balance and manipulating share calculations. Tracking actual received tokens prevents this donation attack.
CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) means validate inputs, update state, then call external functions. This prevents reentrancy by ensuring state is consistent before any external call that could re-enter your contract.
Spot prices can be manipulated in a single transaction via flash loans. TWAP (time-weighted average price) over a period like 30 minutes is much harder to manipulate and more reliable for critical calculations.
No. Use OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard or similar hardened library. Do not write your own when a well-audited version exists.
Run Slither for static analysis, Echidna or Foundry for fuzzing, and manual code review against the security checklist. Test emergency pause and admin functions thoroughly.
Full instructions (SKILL.md)
Source of truth, from affaan-m/ecc.
name: defi-amm-security description: Security checklist for Solidity AMM contracts, liquidity pools, and swap flows. Covers reentrancy, CEI ordering, donation or inflation attacks, oracle manipulation, slippage, admin controls, and integer math. metadata: origin: ECC direct-port adaptation version: "1.0.0"
DeFi AMM Security
Critical vulnerability patterns and hardened implementations for Solidity AMM contracts, LP vaults, and swap functions.
When to Use
- Writing or auditing a Solidity AMM or liquidity-pool contract
- Implementing swap, deposit, withdraw, mint, or burn flows that hold token balances
- Reviewing any contract that uses
token.balanceOf(address(this))in share or reserve math - Adding fee setters, pausers, oracle updates, or other admin functions to a DeFi protocol
How It Works
Use this as a checklist-plus-pattern library. Review every user entrypoint against the categories below and prefer the hardened examples over hand-rolled variants.
Execution Safety
The shell commands in this skill are local audit examples. Run them only in a trusted checkout or disposable sandbox, and do not splice untrusted contract names, paths, RPC URLs, private keys, or user-supplied flags into shell commands. Ask before installing tools or running long fuzzing/static-analysis jobs that may consume significant local or paid resources.
Never include secrets, private keys, seed phrases, API tokens, or mainnet signing credentials in command examples, logs, or reports.
Examples
Reentrancy: enforce CEI order
Vulnerable:
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
token.transfer(msg.sender, amount);
balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
}
Safe:
import {ReentrancyGuard} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient");
balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
}
Do not write your own guard when a hardened library exists.
Donation or inflation attacks
Using token.balanceOf(address(this)) directly for share math lets attackers manipulate the denominator by sending tokens to the contract outside the intended path.
// Vulnerable
function deposit(uint256 assets) external returns (uint256 shares) {
shares = (assets * totalShares) / token.balanceOf(address(this));
}
// Safe
uint256 private _totalAssets;
function deposit(uint256 assets) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 shares) {
uint256 balBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), assets);
uint256 received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balBefore;
shares = totalShares == 0 ? received : (received * totalShares) / _totalAssets;
_totalAssets += received;
totalShares += shares;
}
Track internal accounting and measure actual tokens received.
Oracle manipulation
Spot prices are flash-loan manipulable. Prefer TWAP.
uint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[](2);
secondsAgos[0] = 1800;
secondsAgos[1] = 0;
(int56[] memory tickCumulatives,) = IUniswapV3Pool(pool).observe(secondsAgos);
int24 twapTick = int24(
(tickCumulatives[1] - tickCumulatives[0]) / int56(uint56(30 minutes))
);
uint160 sqrtPriceX96 = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(twapTick);
Slippage protection
Every swap path needs caller-provided slippage and a deadline.
function swap(
uint256 amountIn,
uint256 amountOutMin,
uint256 deadline
) external returns (uint256 amountOut) {
require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "Expired");
amountOut = _calculateOut(amountIn);
require(amountOut >= amountOutMin, "Slippage exceeded");
_executeSwap(amountIn, amountOut);
}
Safe reserve math
import {FullMath} from "@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/FullMath.sol";
uint256 result = FullMath.mulDiv(a, b, c);
For large reserve math, avoid naive a * b / c when overflow risk exists.
Admin controls
import {Ownable2Step} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable2Step.sol";
contract MyAMM is Ownable2Step {
function setFee(uint256 fee) external onlyOwner { ... }
function pause() external onlyOwner { ... }
}
Prefer explicit acceptance for ownership transfer and gate every privileged path.
Security Checklist
- Reentrancy-exposed entrypoints use
nonReentrant - CEI ordering is respected
- Share math does not depend on raw
balanceOf(address(this)) - ERC-20 transfers use
SafeERC20 - Deposits measure actual tokens received
- Oracle reads use TWAP or another manipulation-resistant source
- Swaps require
amountOutMinanddeadline - Overflow-sensitive reserve math uses safe primitives like
mulDiv - Admin functions are access-controlled
- Emergency pause exists and is tested
- Static analysis and fuzzing are run before production
Audit Tools
pip install slither-analyzer
slither . --exclude-dependencies
echidna-test . --contract YourAMM --config echidna.yaml
forge test --fuzz-runs 10000
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