defi-amm-security
affaan-m/everything-claude-code
Security checklist and hardened patterns for Solidity AMM contracts, liquidity pools, and swap functions.
What is defi-amm-security?
A reference guide for auditing and implementing secure Solidity AMM contracts. Covers reentrancy, CEI ordering, donation attacks, oracle manipulation, slippage protection, and safe math. Use this when writing or reviewing any liquidity pool, swap, or token-balance-dependent contract.
- Provides hardened code examples for reentrancy guards and CEI-ordered withdrawals
- Demonstrates protection against donation and inflation attacks via internal accounting
- Shows TWAP-based oracle patterns resistant to flash-loan manipulation
- Includes slippage and deadline validation for swap functions
- Covers safe reserve math using FullMath.mulDiv to prevent overflow
- Enforces admin controls with Ownable2Step and access gates
How to install defi-amm-security
npx skills add https://github.com/affaan-m/everything-claude-code --skill defi-amm-security- Solidity development environment (Foundry, Hardhat, or Truffle)
- Familiarity with ERC-20 token standards and basic AMM mechanics
- OpenZeppelin Contracts library for ReentrancyGuard and SafeERC20
- Optional: Slither, Echidna, or Forge for static analysis and fuzzing
How to use defi-amm-security
- 1.Review the Security Checklist against your contract's entrypoints and functions
- 2.Compare your code patterns against the Vulnerable vs. Safe examples provided
- 3.Apply hardened patterns: use nonReentrant, track internal accounting, measure actual tokens received
- 4.Implement slippage and deadline checks in all swap paths
- 5.Use SafeERC20 for all token transfers and FullMath for reserve calculations
- 6.Add admin controls via Ownable2Step and gate privileged functions
- 7.Run Slither, Echidna, and Forge fuzzing before production deployment
Use cases
- Auditing an existing Solidity AMM or liquidity pool contract for common vulnerabilities
- Implementing a new deposit/withdraw flow that safely tracks token balances
- Adding swap functions with proper slippage and deadline checks
- Reviewing oracle integrations to ensure TWAP usage instead of spot prices
- Setting up admin functions like fee changes and emergency pause mechanisms
- Smart contract developers building AMM or liquidity pool protocols
- Security auditors reviewing Solidity DeFi contracts
- Protocol engineers adding or modifying swap and deposit flows
- Teams preparing contracts for production or formal audit
defi-amm-security FAQ
No. Use OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard or similar hardened library. Do not hand-roll guards when a well-audited alternative exists.
Direct balanceOf calls are vulnerable to donation attacks where an attacker sends tokens to the contract outside the intended deposit path, manipulating share calculations. Internal accounting measures only tokens received through your contract's functions.
Prefer TWAP (time-weighted average price) over spot prices, which are vulnerable to flash-loan manipulation. Use Uniswap V3's observe() function or similar manipulation-resistant sources.
amountOutMin protects against slippage by ensuring the swap fails if output falls below acceptable levels. deadline prevents transactions from executing after the user's intended window, protecting against delayed mempool inclusion.
Run Slither for static analysis, Echidna for property-based fuzzing, and Forge test with high fuzz runs. These catch common patterns and edge cases that manual review may miss.
Full instructions (SKILL.md)
Source of truth, from affaan-m/everything-claude-code.
name: defi-amm-security description: Security checklist for Solidity AMM contracts, liquidity pools, and swap flows. Covers reentrancy, CEI ordering, donation or inflation attacks, oracle manipulation, slippage, admin controls, and integer math. metadata: origin: ECC direct-port adaptation version: "1.0.0"
DeFi AMM Security
Critical vulnerability patterns and hardened implementations for Solidity AMM contracts, LP vaults, and swap functions.
When to Use
- Writing or auditing a Solidity AMM or liquidity-pool contract
- Implementing swap, deposit, withdraw, mint, or burn flows that hold token balances
- Reviewing any contract that uses
token.balanceOf(address(this))in share or reserve math - Adding fee setters, pausers, oracle updates, or other admin functions to a DeFi protocol
How It Works
Use this as a checklist-plus-pattern library. Review every user entrypoint against the categories below and prefer the hardened examples over hand-rolled variants.
Execution Safety
The shell commands in this skill are local audit examples. Run them only in a trusted checkout or disposable sandbox, and do not splice untrusted contract names, paths, RPC URLs, private keys, or user-supplied flags into shell commands. Ask before installing tools or running long fuzzing/static-analysis jobs that may consume significant local or paid resources.
Never include secrets, private keys, seed phrases, API tokens, or mainnet signing credentials in command examples, logs, or reports.
Examples
Reentrancy: enforce CEI order
Vulnerable:
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
token.transfer(msg.sender, amount);
balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
}
Safe:
import {ReentrancyGuard} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient");
balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
}
Do not write your own guard when a hardened library exists.
Donation or inflation attacks
Using token.balanceOf(address(this)) directly for share math lets attackers manipulate the denominator by sending tokens to the contract outside the intended path.
// Vulnerable
function deposit(uint256 assets) external returns (uint256 shares) {
shares = (assets * totalShares) / token.balanceOf(address(this));
}
// Safe
uint256 private _totalAssets;
function deposit(uint256 assets) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 shares) {
uint256 balBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), assets);
uint256 received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balBefore;
shares = totalShares == 0 ? received : (received * totalShares) / _totalAssets;
_totalAssets += received;
totalShares += shares;
}
Track internal accounting and measure actual tokens received.
Oracle manipulation
Spot prices are flash-loan manipulable. Prefer TWAP.
uint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[](2);
secondsAgos[0] = 1800;
secondsAgos[1] = 0;
(int56[] memory tickCumulatives,) = IUniswapV3Pool(pool).observe(secondsAgos);
int24 twapTick = int24(
(tickCumulatives[1] - tickCumulatives[0]) / int56(uint56(30 minutes))
);
uint160 sqrtPriceX96 = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(twapTick);
Slippage protection
Every swap path needs caller-provided slippage and a deadline.
function swap(
uint256 amountIn,
uint256 amountOutMin,
uint256 deadline
) external returns (uint256 amountOut) {
require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "Expired");
amountOut = _calculateOut(amountIn);
require(amountOut >= amountOutMin, "Slippage exceeded");
_executeSwap(amountIn, amountOut);
}
Safe reserve math
import {FullMath} from "@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/FullMath.sol";
uint256 result = FullMath.mulDiv(a, b, c);
For large reserve math, avoid naive a * b / c when overflow risk exists.
Admin controls
import {Ownable2Step} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable2Step.sol";
contract MyAMM is Ownable2Step {
function setFee(uint256 fee) external onlyOwner { ... }
function pause() external onlyOwner { ... }
}
Prefer explicit acceptance for ownership transfer and gate every privileged path.
Security Checklist
- Reentrancy-exposed entrypoints use
nonReentrant - CEI ordering is respected
- Share math does not depend on raw
balanceOf(address(this)) - ERC-20 transfers use
SafeERC20 - Deposits measure actual tokens received
- Oracle reads use TWAP or another manipulation-resistant source
- Swaps require
amountOutMinanddeadline - Overflow-sensitive reserve math uses safe primitives like
mulDiv - Admin functions are access-controlled
- Emergency pause exists and is tested
- Static analysis and fuzzing are run before production
Audit Tools
pip install slither-analyzer
slither . --exclude-dependencies
echidna-test . --contract YourAMM --config echidna.yaml
forge test --fuzz-runs 10000
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